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IN THIS ISSUEFinancing to the private sector in 
China and India has expanded much 
less than aggregate measures of 
financial depth suggest
Among the most notable develop-ments in the global economy over the past 20 years has been 
the rise of China and India as world 
economic powers. Along with high 
overall growth in these economies has 
come an increase in their financial 
activity. But how much have different 
types of firms used capital markets and 
benefited from their expansion?
Didier and Schmukler study this 
question in a new paper by assembling 
a unique and comprehensive data set 
on domestic and international capital 
raising activity and the performance of 
the publicly listed Chinese and Indian 
firms. They compile transaction-level 
information on equity and bond is-
sues, then match these data with an-
nual firm-level balance sheet informa-
tion. Their matched data cover 2,458 
firms in China and 4,305 in India. 
The authors show that the expan-
sion of financing to the private sector 
in China and India has been much 
more subdued than the aggregate 
measures of financial depth suggest. 
Although capital raising activity in 
equity and bond markets expanded 
substantially in 2005–10, it remained 
relatively small. Importantly, this 
expansion was not associated with 
widespread use of capital markets by 
firms. For example, while the amount 
of capital raised through equity issues 
in domestic markets in China doubled 
(from 0.5 to 1 percent of GDP a year) 
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between 2000–04 and 2005–10, the 
number of firms using these markets 
to raise capital per year increased by 
only 20 percent (from 87 to 105 among 
1,621 listed firms). Similar patterns, 
though on a smaller scale, apply to the 
use of foreign markets. 
Not only have few firms made re-
current use of equity and bond mar-
kets; even fewer firms have captured 
the bulk of the capital market financ-
ing. For example, the top 10 firms in 
China and India captured between 43 
and 62 percent of the amount raised 
in 2005–10. Thus the authors’ findings 
suggest that capital markets have not 
been a significant source of financ-
ing across firms. This contrasts with 
the perception in the literature that 
equity markets in the two countries, 
particularly in India, are relatively well 
developed.
The authors also show that firms 
that use equity or bond markets are 
very different from—and behave differ-
ently than—those that do not do so. 
While nonissuing firms in both China 
and India grew at about the same rate 
as the overall economy, issuing firms 
grew twice as fast in 2004–11. Indeed, 
firms that raise capital through equity 
or bonds are typically larger than non-
issuing firms initially and become even 
larger after raising capital. Firms grow 
faster the year before and the year in 
which they raise capital. Moreover, 
firms that use capital markets have ex 
ante a longer liability maturity struc-
ture and more capital expenditures, 
and the differences relative to the 
firms that do not use capital markets 
(continued on page 8)
Have Capital Markets Aided 
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Greater transparency and 
accountability in land policies are 
critical to reducing poverty and 
inequality and promoting growth
With more than 900 partici-pants from 92 countries pre-senting some 250 papers, the 
2013 Annual World Bank Conference 
on Land and Poverty scaled new 
heights in participation. The confer-
ence demonstrated how convening a 
wide range of stakeholders can gener-
ate synergies to enhance impact. A 
few examples of research presented 
at the event show the possibilities for 
putting issues that were traditionally 
thought of as being too politically 
fraught and too technically complex 
on a more rational footing—and thus 
helping to promote transparency and 
accountability, foster dialogue at the 
country level, and build local capacity 
for an evidence-based policy dialogue. 
Large-scale land acquisition. Papers 
showed that the first wave of large 
investments in Africa often failed to 
fully realize the opportunities to im-
prove productivity and generate local 
benefits. To improve outcomes, better 
evidence and greater collaboration 
between public and private actors are 
needed. A new generation of impact 
evaluations of new business models 
and contractual arrangements directly 
with investors are emerging, to provide 
evidence on the most effective ap-
proaches under different conditions. 
Urbanization. The nature of land 
rights and the way in which govern-
ments exercise eminent domain will 
have far-reaching implications for 
urbanization processes and urban 
shape as well as for the ability to 
deliver services and make much-
needed public infrastructure invest-
ments. Yet with urban land often 
a major source of rent, these raise 
important political economy issues. 
Conference participants discussed 
innovative approaches to overcom-
ing these, including in land use plan-
ning and collecting land tax so as to 
avoid informality and promote fiscal 
independence by local governments. 
This discussion was complemented by 
examples of responses to high demand 
for greater tenure security in informal 
urban settlements in Brazil, China, 
Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, the 
Philippines, and Tanzania. 
Service delivery. With land registries 
and land-related institutions continu-
ally ranking high on international mea-
sures of corruption, new technology to 
make information more widely acces-
sible can be a major force in improving 
transparency and quality in service 
delivery. It can also allow civil society 
groups to help individuals or com-
munities get basic formal recognition, 
to be expanded on as needed. Papers 
presented examples showing how the 
greater transparency in service delivery 
created by such technology enabled 
women and disadvantaged people to 
take full advantage of their assets for 
social and economic empowerment. 
Although use of land as collateral is 
not feasible everywhere, there are situ-
ations in which it can promote finan-
cial sector development and particu-
larly housing construction.
Postconflict reconstruction. Reconstruc-
tion efforts in postconflict settings pro-
vide a unique opportunity for address-
ing issues of land access and land use, 
including how to deal with refugees 
and displaced people and handle loss 
of land ownership documentation 
without fostering land grabbing. But 
this opportunity is easily missed and 
conditions may be created that foster 
nontransparent deals—rather than 
promoting justice and reconciliation 
and attracting investment that can pro-
vide opportunities for local people to 
move out of poverty. Once the window 
of opportunity has closed, it is very 
difficult to catch up, and land often 
becomes a new trigger of conflict. 
Climate change. Efforts to reduce 
emissions from land use decisions, 
which can contribute substantially to 
global emissions, have moved high 
up on the global agenda. Yet unclear 
land tenure arrangements may under-
mine the impact of such initiatives. 
Legal initiatives and use of innovative 
technology to recognize and map for-
estland and to monitor deforestation 
can have an important impact at the 
local level, while better links to land 
tenure information can improve the 
effectiveness of interventions to mea-
sure and predict such changes. These 
new approaches can improve land use 
by identifying unused land and us-
ing mechanisms (including payments 
for ecosystem services) to bring it to 
better uses and, in doing so, enhance 
transparency and accountability and 
reduce inequality. 
Land governance. Together with the 
Bank’s regional departments and other 
partners, the Development Economics 
Senior Vice Presidency (DEC) has 
been developing the Land Governance 
Assessment as a diagnostic tool to 
operationalize global standards. This 
tool has been applied or is being 
implemented in some 30 countries, 
and results were presented, generat-
ing significant interest. Countries now 
build on these results to establish 
multistakeholder platforms to design 
country-specific strategies and ways to 
monitor progress. 
The greater recognition of the im-
portance of land issues at the global 
level—including a G8 initiative on land 
transparency that was announced at 
the event—calls for ways to focus the 
discussion, generate a constituency 
for change, and develop monitoring 
indicators at the country level. And it 
implies a need to strengthen country 
capacity for regular monitoring and 
impact evaluation, increase the trans-
parency of land-related investment, 
and design and assess the impact of 
sustainable models to record land 
rights. Together with the many partners 
contributing to the conference, DEC is 
committed to pursue these goals and, 
in doing so, to build capacity, foster 
debate, and implement policies and 
programs to address land issues in a 
way that is equitable, gender sensitive, 
and growth promoting. 
FOCUS  
Land and Poverty: The Importance of Transparency
More information can be found at http:// 
econ.worldbank.org/landconference2013.
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Using sectoral subsidies to keep 
prices low is generally suboptimal. 
Other means can be more efficient 
and less distorting
Between 2003 and 2012 the av-erage annual world prices of gasoline, diesel, and kerosene 
in 160 countries more than doubled, 
while cooking gas prices increased by 
two-thirds (with prices converted to 
local currency units and adjusted for 
domestic inflation). Unable to cope 
with steadily climbing world oil prices, 
many developing countries have made 
little progress in reforming the pric-
ing of oil products. End-user prices of 
oil products vary across countries by 
more than a factor of 100. 
These large price variations point 
to the prevalence of continuing gov-
ernment influence on domestic fuel 
prices. Governments use a range of 
policies to keep domestic prices low, 
including setting prices or price ceil-
ings, providing price subsidies, estab-
lishing a mechanism for smoothing 
prices, reducing taxes, requiring oil 
companies to bear some or all subsidy 
costs, and imposing export restric-
tions. A recent study by Kojima shows 
that in the past three years two-fifths 
of the 65 developing countries exam-
ined have frozen the retail prices of 
gasoline, diesel, or both for months or 
even years at a time. 
More generally, about two-thirds of 
the study countries have kept domes-
tic prices below market-based levels 
for one or more fuels, subsidizing con-
sumers. In every case the government 
pays directly or indirectly—through 
budgetary transfers, tax expenditures, 
or lower corporate tax collection due 
to financial losses suffered by oil com-
panies. Many countries have universal 
price subsidies, which are widely ac-
knowledged to be regressive. Quite a 
few have subsidies targeting certain 
consumer categories; those targeting 
the poor are rare. By compensating 
one or more consumer categories 
through price adjustments rather than 
through other forms of assistance, 
Coping with $100 Oil
these pricing policies also distort the 
downstream oil market.  
On paper, a price smoothing 
scheme can be self-financing: in times 
of low world prices, consumers pay 
more and the savings are put aside; in 
times of high world prices, the savings 
are drawn down to re-
imburse the oil market-
ers to keep prices low. 
In practice, however, 
most price smoothing 
schemes build up defi-
cits over time, eventu-
ally requiring budgetary 
transfers or large loans. 
The budgetary transfers 
can run into billions of 
dollars, as in Colombia 
and Peru. 
Targeted subsidies 
for oil products have large leakages 
because liquid fuels are easy to store 
and transport. Differentiating prices 
for the same or similar oil products by 
user category creates powerful finan-
cial incentives to divert lower-priced 
fuels to users who are not eligible for 
the price discounts. Typical recipi-
ents of such targeted price subsidies 
are households, transport operators, 
farmers, and fishermen. Many govern-
ments price kerosene below diesel in 
the name of protecting households 
that use kerosene for cooking, light-
ing, and heating. Kerosene, however, 
is well suited for adulterating diesel. 
The larger the price difference, the 
greater is the financial incentive to di-
vert kerosene to the automotive diesel 
sector. Chemical marking, color dyes, 
and other detection measures can curb 
diversion to a degree, but people will 
find ways to get around the detection 
system. Also common is the diver-
sion to commercial establishments of 
subsidized cooking gas sold in small 
cylinders for households. These crimi-
nal activities worsen governance in the 
downstream oil sector, making sector 
reforms difficult. 
Fuel shortages—and flourishing 
black markets with higher prices—are 
common in markets with low official 
prices. Shortages occur because of 
diversion and smuggling and because 
of the government’s inability or unwill-
ingness to reimburse oil companies 
for subsidies. Cash-strapped oil com-
panies may cut back on refining and 
imports, and even shut down filling 
stations if losses become unsustain-
ably large. Subsidies 
may be channeled 
through state-owned 
oil companies, granting 
them a monopoly or 
near-monopoly status. 
Not having to face com-
petition, they become 
opaque and inefficient, 
raising costs.
Given the weight of 
evidence, governments 
should pursue policies 
to make the down-
stream oil sector competitive as well 
as deregulate the sector, achieving the 
objectives of price controls through 
means other than exercising control 
over pricing and fuel allocation. For 
the purpose of helping the poor cope 
with high oil prices, the long-term 
goal should be to replace fuel price 
subsidies with effective social service 
delivery. Arguably, the most efficient 
and least distorting approach is to 
transfer cash as part of an integrated, 
comprehensive poverty alleviation 
program; government interventions 
to keep prices low for each good and 
service through sectoral subsidies are 
generally suboptimal. In parallel, to re-
duce vulnerability to oil price volatility, 
governments should promote energy 
conservation measures throughout the 
economy and facilitate fuel diversifi-
cation to reduce overreliance on oil 
where it makes economic sense. 
Masami Kojima. 2013. “Petroleum Product Pric-
ing and Complementary Policies: Experience of 65 
Developing Countries since 2009.” Policy Research 
Working Paper 6396, World Bank, Washington, 
DC.
Given the weight 
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4 ResearchDigestWorld Bank
How Fit Are Feed-In Tariff Policies?
When using feed-in tariffs for 
renewable energy, governments can 
use complementary policies to get 
more bang for their buck 
Countries around the world have used various incentive programs to accelerate the deployment of 
renewable energy. These range from 
direct subsidies or tax incentives to 
market-share mandates implemented 
with tradable credits to competitive 
bidding. But the most popular support 
program is the feed-in tariff.  
Under a feed-in tariff policy, gov-
ernments set prices—often at a pre-
mium—for different types of renew-
able power to compensate producers 
for the higher cost of producing clean 
energy. Utilities are required to pur-
chase power from renewable resources 
at this price, but can either spread the 
additional costs across their entire 
customer base or receive compensa-
tion from the government to recover 
the incremental costs. Feed-in tariffs 
essentially work as subsidies to renew-
able energy sources to make them 
cost-competitive with fossil-fuel-based 
technologies. 
Feed-in tariffs have for the most 
part been viewed as successful in 
terms of deployment: by some esti-
mates they are responsible for about 
75 percent of global solar photovoltaic 
and 45 percent of global wind capacity. 
But their record in cost-effectiveness 
is less consistent. In many countries 
the cost effects of feed-in tariff poli-
cies have become a primary concern 
for policy makers. Whether the costs 
are recovered from ratepayers or tax-
payers, rising costs can create both 
political and economic pressures. 
Households in developing countries 
are particularly vulnerable to rising tar-
iffs because energy consumes a larger 
share of their incomes than for house-
holds in developed countries. 
Reliable empirical studies on the 
cost-effectiveness of feed-in tariffs are 
sparse, in part because of the complex-
ity and variety of the policies as imple-
mented and the lack of comparable 
data across countries. A new paper by 
Zhang attempts to rectify the prob-
lem by reviewing the detailed design 
features of wind feed-in tariffs in 35 
European countries during 1991–2010 
and matching them with generator-
level wind installation data. Using the 
new data set, the author estimates the 
responsiveness of wind deployment 
to different levels of feed-in support. 
The empirical analysis helps to identify 
policy design features that are more 
cost-effective in stimulating renewable 
investment. 
A critical issue affecting the analy-
sis is how to infer the causal link 
between investments and incentives. 
Countries with poorer wind conditions 
are more likely to provide higher incen-
tives to make wind cost-competitive. 
There could also be feedback from past 
investment to current values of feed-in 
tariff support because tariffs may be 
revised downward as capacity expands 
and installation costs fall. The author 
uses various econometric techniques, 
including instrumental variables, to 
address the potential endogeneity of 
feed-in tariff rates.
Based on a series of statistical 
tests, the author finds that higher 
subsidies have not necessarily yielded 
greater levels of renewable instal-
lation. Three factors could explain 
this weak correlation. First, countries 
providing high subsidies may lack the 
necessary institutional and regulatory 
environment to attract investment and 
may have failed to scale up investment 
because of this noneconomic barrier. 
Second, overly generous subsidies 
may have provided rent-seeking oppor-
tunities as suppliers along the value 
chain push up system costs in order to 
take a share of excess remuneration. 
In this case higher feed-in tariffs are 
correlated with higher system costs, 
which in turn inhibit the ability of the 
industry to expand renewable capacity. 
Third, the results show that higher 
feed-in tariffs are negatively correlated 
with the wind capacity factor, indicat-
ing that high remuneration may have 
allowed investment in high-cost sites 
such as those with low wind speed. 
Since wind investment is negatively 
correlated with investment cost (in eu-
ros per megawatt-hour), high subsidies 
again result in a weaker investment 
response. 
But the results also show that con-
tract duration and interconnection 
guarantees (both technical and legal) 
for renewable electricity are important 
determinants of the “shadow price” of 
feed-in support—extending a five-year 
agreement by one year increases an-
nual wind investment by 6 percentage 
points on average, while providing 
guaranteed grid access almost doubles 
wind investment in one year. Because 
both parameters are crucial to investor 
confidence in long-term market secu-
rity, the results suggest that policy cer-
tainty is at least as important as short-
run financial incentives in attracting 
private participation. 
Finally, the analysis shows that the 
design of the overall electricity market 
matters. A competitive market tends to 
be more conducive to renewable de-
ployment. One possible explanation is 
that wholesale competition raises the 
upside potential of renewable invest-
ments because many countries allow 
renewable generators to sell directly 
in the open exchange. This enables 
renewable developers to benefit from 
higher market prices, especially during 
the peak demand period. 
Overall, the experience of wind 
development in Europe suggests 
great potential for improving the cost-
effectiveness of feed-in tariff policies. 
While the level of subsidy is a poor 
predictor of deployment, governments 
can attract investment by providing fa-
vorable grid access conditions, invest-
ment stability guaranteed by a long-
term feed-in tariff contract, and low 
administrative and regulatory barriers. 
Fan Zhang. 2013. “How Fit Are Feed-In Tariff 
Policies? Evidence from the European Wind Mar-
ket.” Policy Research Working Paper 6376, World 
Bank, Washington, DC.
5ResearchDigestWorld Bank
Politics can undermine pro-poor 
service delivery. Understanding 
why can help in building better 
institutions for accountability 
Vote buying, the direct exchange of gifts or money for political support at the time of elections, 
is widespread in many developing 
countries. Much is known about vote 
buying as a political strategy, and 
there is a common view that such 
political practices can undermine 
democratic principles. But an impor-
tant question remains open: Are there 
any consequences for public policy 
performance when governments gain 
or lose office in elections with wide-
spread vote buying? Where politicians 
have to woo demanding voters, do the 
inducements they offer to win political 
support include not only gifts during 
elections but public services between 
elections? 
A new paper by Khemani provides 
direct empirical evidence, for the first 
time, that where vote buying practices 
are more prevalent, governments in-
vest less in pro-poor services. That is, 
political incentives matter significantly 
for the delivery of services.
This evidence was generated by 
taking advantage of an institutional 
context that is increasingly common 
among developing countries—the 
decentralized delivery of basic public 
services that are used largely by poor 
people, such as in health, education, 
and infrastructure. The data come 
from the primary health sector in the 
Philippines, where directly elected mu-
nicipal governments are responsible 
for delivering basic maternal and child 
health services to villages within their 
jurisdiction. Municipalities hire and 
manage nurses, midwives, and com-
munity or village health workers, the 
key health personnel responsible for 
delivering services to poor people. 
The author’s central finding is that 
in places where households report 
greater vote buying (in direct response 
to questions about offers of money 
in exchange for votes at the time of 
elections), municipal government re-
cords show lower investment in basic 
health services—a smaller share of 
spending allocated to health and fewer 
village health workers and health proj-
ects. Strikingly, in places with greater 
vote buying, a larger share of children 
are severely underweight, possibly a 
summary consequence of underinvest-
ment in pro-poor services. 
The data collection was designed 
to allow testing and interpretation of 
these correlations as driven by institu-
tions of “clientelist” politics. Where 
underlying conditions are conducive 
to the use of vote buying or clientelist 
strategies, the politicians who win 
office are likely to use fewer public 
resources for delivering broadly pro-
poor public services and to perform 
worse in carrying out this function. To 
measure possibly idiosyncratic varia-
tion in vote buying practices at disag-
gregated levels, whose correlation with 
health services is not attributable to 
any channel outside clientelism, the 
research surveyed 30 municipalities in 
one province (Isabela) in 2010, a few 
months before local elections. Several 
alternative explanations were tested, 
such as that greater poverty drives 
both greater vote buying practices 
and poorer health outcomes, leading 
to a spurious correlation between the 
two. The data do not support such 
alternatives.
Other types of services—infrastruc-
ture projects and targeted assistance 
to households in time of need—serve 
as revealing comparators. They are rel-
atively more “targetable” than health 
services and therefore more compat-
ible with clientelist political strategies 
than broadly delivered services. They 
have also been described as amenable 
to elite and political capture. The data 
show a positive, though not statistical-
ly significant, correlation of vote buy-
ing with targeted assistance to house-
holds and with mayoral road projects 
in the sampled villages (in contrast 
with the negative correlation with 
health services). That is, vote buying 
is robustly correlated with lower levels 
of a particular type of service having 
the following characteristics: being 
pro-poor (wealthier quintiles tend not 
to use the health services that munici-
palities provide) and being a broadly 
delivered service that is (relatively) 
less amenable to narrow targeting.
Why is vote buying associated with 
weak political incentives to serve the 
poor? One answer worthy of future in-
vestigation revolves around the qual-
ity of politicians. Once vote buying or 
clientelism has emerged as an effec-
tive political strategy, for whatever rea-
sons (including historical ones), it can 
shape who wants to become a politi-
cian and why. The practice can encour-
age the emergence of low-quality con-
tenders who invest in building political 
support on the basis of vote buying, 
or even violence, so that once in pow-
er they can get away with poor perfor-
mance and the extraction of high rents 
from public office. 
Micro-empirical research suggests 
that in developing democracies po-
litical institutions are dynamic rather 
than ossified into bad equilibriums. 
For example, political competition has 
become decentralized, reducing bar-
riers to entry for would-be contenders 
and generating variation in the quality 
of politicians and the platforms of 
competition. The aspiration of lo-
cal leaders to higher national office 
can improve the trade-off they face 
between good leadership and rent 
extraction from public resources. A 
rigorous understanding of political in-
centives could help in better designing 
available instruments for institution 
building—such as transparency, citizen 
organization, and performance-based 
grants to local governments—helping 
to nudge these away from clientelism 
and toward the broad public interest.
Political Incentives to Underinvest 
in Pro-poor Policies 
Stuti Khemani. 2013. “Buying Votes vs. Supply-
ing Public Services: Political Incentives to Under-
invest in Pro-poor Policies.” Policy Research Work-
ing Paper 6339, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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Mass Media and Public Policy 
for Agriculture
As economies grow, policy typically 
shifts from taxing to subsidizing 
agriculture. Mass media can have a 
moderating effect 
Mass media plays a crucial role in distributing information and in shaping public policy. 
Theory shows that information pro-
vided by the mass media reflects its 
incentives to provide news to different 
groups in a society and in turn shapes 
the influence of these groups on policy 
making.  
Media coverage affects the ef-
ficiency with which politicians reach 
different groups with their campaign 
promises. If a political party promises 
support to voters who receive less 
news coverage, only a fraction of these 
voters will be aware of it. A spending 
promise to this group therefore will 
not win many votes. But if the party 
were to make a similar promise to a 
group that attracts substantial media 
coverage (for example, because the 
group forms a large audience or be-
cause it is more valuable to advertis-
ers), this will lead to a stronger voter 
response. The result is that policies 
will be more favorable to the second 
group. 
A new paper by Olper and Swinnen 
explores what this means for agri-
cultural policy. A stylized fact about 
agricultural policy is the so-called 
development paradox, the policy 
switch from taxation to subsidization 
of agriculture with economic develop-
ment. The classic interpretation of this 
pattern is that the political equilibrium 
changes when a country becomes rich 
because the rural-urban income gap 
increases, it becomes less costly to 
subsidize agriculture, and agricultural 
interests become more effective in col-
lective action. 
Mass media has an impact on this 
equilibrium. Government transfers are 
biased toward larger groups because of 
scale economies in the media. Because 
the share of farmers is larger in poor 
countries, mass media competition 
has a different effect on agricultural 
policy in poor countries than in richer 
ones. In particular, while mass media 
competition is predicted to reduce ag-
ricultural protection in rich countries, 
it is expected to increase protection 
(or reduce taxation) in poor ones.
Another prediction is that govern-
ment transfers will be 
biased toward richer 
groups because they are 
more attractive to ad-
vertisers. The impact for 
agricultural protection 
is small in (very) poor 
countries, where rural 
and urban incomes are 
similar, and negative in 
rich and emerging mar-
ket economies, where 
urban incomes are high-
er than rural incomes. 
This effect can be rein-
forced by an uneven spread of mass 
media (such as television) between 
urban and rural areas. In very poor 
countries the diffusion of television in 
both urban and rural areas is low. As 
economies grow, the diffusion in urban 
areas increases relative to that in rural 
areas, with the gap narrowing at high 
income levels. 
This leads to two hypotheses: that 
given the changing role of the agricul-
tural sector due to economic develop-
ment, the impact of mass media com-
petition on agricultural policy will dif-
fer between poor and rich countries, all 
else being equal; and that this effect is 
contrary to the so-called development 
paradox of agricultural policy. Thus the 
traditional change in agricultural pol-
icy from taxation to subsidization as-
sociated with economic development 
will be mitigated in the presence of 
mass media competition. The authors 
hypothesize that this is due to a com-
bination of the group size effect, with 
larger groups being more attractive to 
the media, and the advertiser value 
effect, with richer groups being more 
attractive audiences for the media. 
To empirically test these predic-
tions, the authors use a new World 
Bank data set on taxation and subsidi-
zation of farmers and food consumers 
in 69 countries since 1960. Their analy-
sis looks at both cross-country and 
time-series variation in the data. 
The authors’ empirical results are 
consistent with the theoretical hypoth-
esis that public support for agricul-
ture is affected by the mass media. In 
particular, an increase 
in media penetration 
is correlated with a re-
duction in agricultural 
taxation in poor coun-
tries and a reduction in 
agricultural subsidies in 
rich ones. These results 
are robust to the use 
of different indicators 
of agricultural policies, 
different media vari-
ables, different control 
variables, and different 
estimation techniques. 
The authors’ findings contribute to 
a growing body of evidence suggest-
ing that a free and independent me-
dia is key to efficient public policies. 
Previous studies suggest that a more 
informed and politically active elec-
torate increases the incentives for a 
government to be responsive and that 
the mass media reduces the power 
of special-interest lobbies relative to 
unorganized interests. The results are 
consistent with the argument that an 
increase in media (television) diffusion 
is associated with policies that benefit 
the majority to a greater extent (that 
is, a reduction in the taxation of farm-
ers in poor countries and a reduction 
in the subsidization of farmers in rich 
countries) and that increased competi-
tion in commercial media contributes 
to more efficient public policies by 
reducing transfers to special-interest 
groups. 
Alessandro Olper and Johan Swinnen. 2013. 
“Mass Media and Public Policy: Global Evidence 
from Agricultural Policies.” Policy Research Work-
ing Paper 6362, World Bank, Washington, DC.
An increase in 
media penetration 
is correlated with 
a reduction in 
agricultural taxation 
in poor countries 
and a reduction in 
agricultural subsidies 
in rich ones
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Managing Public Debt in Small States
Public debt management should 
be a priority for small states. But 
assessments of their performance 
reveal a different story
Arguments in favor of sound public debt management are compelling. Empirical evidence 
supports the view that the higher the 
quality of a country’s policies and 
institutions, the better is its capacity 
to carry debt and withstand exogenous 
shocks. Public debt management is 
particularly important for small states 
(defined as having a population of 
less than 2 million). Small states 
face circumstances that expose their 
economies to broader risks—limited 
economic opportunities, lack of diver-
sity, disproportionately high infrastruc-
ture and transaction costs, and high 
vulnerability to natural disasters—all 
of which may heighten the risk of sig-
nificant and rapidly worsening  
macroeconomic and debt crises. 
Yet most small states have only 
rudimentary public debt manage-
ment functions, practices, and sys-
tems, a new paper by Prasad, Pollock, 
and Li finds. This finding is based 
on the results of Debt Management 
Performance Assessments (DeMPAs) 
conducted between 2007 and 2012 
in 17 of the 35 small states classified 
by the World Bank as low or middle 
income. The DeMPA tool measures 
strengths and weaknesses in public 
debt management through a compre-
hensive and objective set of 35 debt 
performance indicators that cover core 
areas of public debt management: 
governance and strategy development, 
coordination with fiscal and monetary 
policy, policies and procedures for bor-
rowing, cash flow forecasting and cash 
management, operational risk, and 
debt recording and reporting. More 
than half the small states in the sam-
ple (53 percent) met the minimum re-
quirements for fewer than 10 of the 35 
indicators, well below the comparable 
scores for the other developing coun-
tries that were assessed. And none of 
the small states in the sample met the 
minimum requirements for more than 
20 of the indicators.
Small states, regardless of income 
level or geographic location, were 
found to have strikingly similar public 
debt management capacity. Although 
it was expected that higher per capita 
income might be associ-
ated with better policies 
and more robust insti-
tutional capacity, this 
turned out not to be the 
case; states classified 
as low income exhibited 
somewhat better debt 
management perfor-
mance. Among those 
that issued debt, the 
capacity to manage do-
mestic debt was more 
robust than the capacity 
to manage external debt, though most 
small states relied much more on ex-
ternal sources of financing, on average, 
than on domestic markets.
Compared with other developing 
countries, small states scored well 
on coordination of debt management 
with fiscal and monetary policy. This 
includes rules on access to funds from 
central banks through ceilings and 
tenors. Small states frequently had a 
legal framework to govern public bor-
rowing in place as well as relatively 
strong procedures for borrowing in do-
mestic markets, though they typically 
made only limited use of market-based 
mechanisms to issue domestic debt. 
A critical deficiency revealed by 
the DeMPAs was the widespread lack 
of capacity in small states to monitor 
and assess the cost-effectiveness of 
external borrowing terms and condi-
tions. Coupled with poor mechanisms 
for debt reporting and the almost total 
absence of internal and external audit-
ing of debt management activities, this 
was worrisome. The assessments also 
showed that most small states did not 
formulate and publish a debt manage-
ment strategy. 
There is no evidence in the litera-
ture to suggest that debt management 
practices that work in large states will 
not work equally well in small ones. 
The fact that small states have already 
demonstrated their ability to perform 
well in some dimensions of debt 
management bears this out. Small 
states, because of their size and other 
features, may face institutional and 
human resource constraints. But small 
size also brings with 
it some advantages. 
When only a limited 
number of institutions 
and staff are engaged 
in debt management, 
this greatly simplifies 
the process of coordina-
tion between the dif-
ferent elements of debt 
management and fiscal 
and monetary policy. In 
addition, small states 
typically have public 
debt portfolios that are made up of a 
limited number of instruments and are 
therefore relatively easy to monitor. 
The authors identify several practi-
cal steps that small states can take to 
improve debt management capacity. 
Most are relatively simple but likely 
to have a rapid payoff. They include 
benefiting from the experience of other 
developing countries; tackling the easi-
est problems first (that is, picking the 
low-hanging fruit, especially capitaliz-
ing on the capacity to coordinate with 
fiscal and monetary policy); maximiz-
ing gains from information technology; 
realizing full benefits from staff train-
ing; pooling resources and reducing 
costs through regional cooperation in 
preparing debt reports and manuals; 
and lowering currency risk and devel-
oping domestic debt markets.
Abha Prasad, Malvina Pollock, and Ying Li. 
2013. “Small States: Performance in Debt Man-
agement.” Policy Research Working Paper 6356, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Small states can 
improve debt 
management 
capacity by taking 
practical steps that 
are relatively simple 
but likely to have a 
rapid payoff
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become more accentuated ex post. 
Notably, all the differences between 
users and nonusers are associated 
with the probability of raising capital. 
The evidence on firm size and 
growth has important implications 
for the firm size distribution of listed 
firms. Quantile regressions show that 
the distribution of issuing firms is 
tilted to the right and shifts more over 
time than the distribution of nonissu-
ing firms, suggesting no convergence 
in firm size; if anything, the distribu-
tions seem to diverge.
The findings suggest that finance 
matters, but in more nuanced ways 
than previously thought. Even though 
the financial markets in China and 
India arguably are not yet fully devel-
oped, the firms that are able to raise 
capital do appear to benefit from it, 
particularly in their overall expansion. 
In other words, at least part of the high 
growth in these countries seems to 
come from the firms that are able to 
raise new funds from the markets. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that 
even large firms appear to be partly 
financially constrained. The difference 
in performance observed between us-
ers and nonusers of capital market 
financing suggests that for the group 
of publicly listed firms that issue secu-
rities, performance is sensitive to the 
external capital raised. That firms per-
form differently and expand when they 
raise capital also implies that they 
had investment opportunities ex ante 
that they could not realize. While the 
authors show that capital raising activ-
ity is related to changes in firm dynam-
ics, they do not analyze to what extent 
the effects are driven by the supply 
side (capital markets) or the demand 
side (firms). Doing so requires further 
research.
In recent decades many emerging 
economies have undertaken large ef-
forts to increase the scope and depth 
of their capital markets and to liberal-
ize their financial sectors as a way to 
complete and increase the provision 
of financial services. But expanding 
capital markets might tend to directly 
benefit the largest firms—those able 
to reach some minimum threshold size 
for issuance. More widespread direct 
and indirect effects are more difficult 
to elucidate. 
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